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Abstract 
This paper contributes to understanding  liquidity risk and its role in systemic financial crises. It focuses on the new 
banking regulation Basel III, in particularly on the Liquidity risk ratio that measures long-term liquidity positions of 
European banks. It emphasizes the importance and the issues relating to the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) which 
will become a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. Application at a level of 100% to credit institutions and systemic 
investment firms is not however expected before 2020, two years after the date of entry into force of the proposed 
Regulation. The paper aims to analyze the relationship between NSFR and banking stability, financial markets factors 
and central bank operations, in order to understand the potential impact of the key components of the new Basel global 
regulatory framework. 
Keywords: banks, basel III, net stable funding ratio, liquidity risk, banking regulation 
JEL Codes: G21; G28 
1. Introduction 
The theory of financial intermediation highlights two central roles of banks in the economy, the first is liquidity creation, 
and the second role is risk transformation. Commercial banks take funds in the form of deposits from the public, and 
provide loans to the businesses, households and other sectors. They thus contribute to economic growth by financing 
investment and facilitating production through converting liquid liabilities into illiquid assets. In spite of this, however, 
they can suffer from fragility of their capital structure because of imbalance between liabilities and assets. Furthermore, 
distress to funding and  liquidity crunch are both critical issues in many systemic banking crises. A financial crisis 
often begins with relatively minor problems which are increased and magnified by lack of liquidity in an already 
vulnerable system. 
In response to the recent global financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision announced a new 
international regulatory framework for banks. Basel III  introduced liquidity regulation for managing liquidity risk in  
several aspects. It includes  the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) and liquidity 
risk monitoring tools that aim to ensure the quantity of high-quality liquid assets that banks will be obliged to hold in 
order to better manage the maturity mismatch between their assets and liabilities.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review, Section 3 discusses the liquidity risk in the 
recent financial crisis and illustrates some possible liquidity spirals. Section 4 discusses the Basel liquidity regulation 
and Section 5 presents the empirical analysis of the relationship between NSFR and banking stability, financial markets 
factors, and central bank operations. Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
Several studies on financial crises have emphasised the importance of liquidity risk. Diamond and Dybvig (2007) 
discuss liquidity creation as a core function of banks. They develop a model useful to understand bank runs and other 
types of financial crises, as well as ways of preventing such crises. The reasons why bank assets are illiquid and other 
reasons that banks help to create liquidity are analyzed in Diamond and Rajan (2005). They argue that bank failures can 
be contagious. Failures can occur not just as a result of depositor panics or contractual links between banks, but also 
because bank failures can diminish the common pool of liquidity, thus causing or aggravating aggregate liquidity 
shortages. This can have serious consequences; contagion of failure or even a total crash of the system. 
Some authors such as Persaud (2003) and Hull (2015) make a contribution to defining and understanding "liquidity 
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black holes" as situations in the markets "when a price decline causes more market participants to want to sell, driving 
prices well below where they eventually settle. During the sell-off, liquidity dries up and the asset can be sold only at a 
fire-sale price". Since a "liquidity black hole'' is the analogue of the run outcome in a bank run model, Morris and Shin 
(2004) provide empirical implications and solutions for the sole trigger point at which the liquidity black hole comes 
into existence. 
With reference to the impact of the new global regulatory framework (Basel III), a  preliminary global analysis was 
carried out by the Basel Committee and one at European level by the European Banking Authority (EBA). 
Dietrich et al. (2014) show that larger and faster growing banks active in asset management and investment banking 
historically were not historically in compliance with net stable funding ratio (NSFR). Many of them began to improve 
after the onset of the 2008 crisis. 
Vazquez & Federico (2012) measure structural liquidity in bank balance sheets using the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR) proposed in Basel III. They define the impact of the approximated NSFR and bank leverage on the probability 
of default. They argue that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage before the global financial crisis 
were more susceptible to fail. They also note that small banks were more liable to failure on liquidity problems, while 
large international banks were more likely to fail because of insufficient capital buffers. 
The aim of the new Basel III framework is "to improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress" (BCBS 2010) , thus to improve financial stability and resilience of financial institutions, 
preventing bank failures(BCBS 2011).  
Hong et al. (2014) calculate the approximate measures of the Basel III LCR and NSFR for US banks. The authors draw 
up a bank failure model and find that market-wide liquidity risk is significant in predicting bank failure, while 
idiosyncratic liquidity risk is less important.  
There are few studies on the determinants of liquidity risk.  Since before Basel III, liquidity risk has been a part of the 
category of the residual risk, even from a regulatory standpoint. Many economists and researchers thus analyze it as a 
determinant of other risks, including credit risk (Treepongkaruna et al.2011)  
Recent studies have been conducted on the determinants of liquidity in Hungarian commercial banks during the period 
2001-2010 (Vodovà, 2013). Vodovà finds that bank liquidity is positively related to capital adequacy of banks, interest 
rate on loans and bank profitability and negatively related to the size of the bank, interest margin, monetary policy 
interest rate and the interest rate on interbank transactions.  
There are various financial sector mechanisms which can lead to a small shock having a big effect. Krishnamurthy(2010) 
identifies financial amplification mechanisms which can be activated during a crisis, including leverage, tight credit 
conditions and limited capital. 
3. Liquidity Risk in the Recent Financial Crisis  
There are many ways of defining the concepts of liquidity and liquidity risk. According to the European Banking 
Authority (EBA, 2013), liquidity is the “risk that an institution cannot meet its financial obligations, such as payments 
and collateral needs, as they fall due in the short and medium term, either at all or without incurring unacceptable 
losses.”  
Over the past 20 years, financial markets have experienced several liquidity crises. Minor turmoil in financial markets 
can be amplified by liquidity problems, leading to a major crisis. (For an overview of liquidity crises and liquidity more 
broadly, see Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2013). 
The banking industry faced huge losses during the recent financial crisis, but outright losses from subprime mortgages 
were relatively small, equivalent to a 2–3 percent fall in U.S. stock prices (IMF, April 2008 Global Financial Stability 
Report). However, the problems were amplified enormously through liquidity effects,  and spread to many other key 
sectors of the financial system and economy. Once Lehman Brothers began to have financial difficulties with immediate 
payments, additional losses were incurred that pushed it deeper into insolvency. In another example, Bear Stearns was 
the fifth largest investment bank in the United States 
According to the vigilance inspectors, it exceeded regulatory capital requirements, but its market capitalization 
deteriorated through the second half of 2007, there were rumors that clients were withdrawing capital from the bank, 
and it failed in 2008. Likewise, the British Northern Rock requested emergency funding from the Bank of England 
because it lost the ability to borrow from other banks, could not securitize and had insufficient liquid assets to survive 
for more than a few weeks. In 2007, the bank received a liquidity support facility from the Bank of England and several 
months later, in 2008, it was nationalized. 
The issues encountered in the interbank market created major problems for banks. They started accumulating liquidity, 
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preferring more liquid assets and reducing the periods at which they would lend to other banks. Confidence in the 
banking system was severely undermined and led to the banks' reluctance to lend to one another, and consequently, 
unprecedented illiquidity in the interbank markets. 
When the banking system comes under strong funding pressure, central banks introduce emergency liquidity operations, 
and apply non-standard monetary policy measures. The funding system connects banks with other banks, and other 
financial and non-financial sectors. The failure of one entity to meet its obligations punctually and in full  can cause 
others to be short of liquidity, and create a cascade mechanism with a negative illiquidity effect. In fact the liquidity 
properties of an asset or an entity are determined by market conditions and by the interrelation between market 
participants, not only by the features of the asset or entity itself. 
4. Basel Liquidity Regulation 
The financial crisis, in which liquidity shocks at individual institutions led to a systemic crisis in financial markets 
obliged the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to re-evaluate and boost guidelines and fundamental 
principles on which liquidity risk management is based. “Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk 
Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” is key document published in 2010. It looks at how banks manage risks 
connected to liquidity funding. 
Two new standards were issued by BCBS: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR). They address two complementary sets of issues. LCR  "aims to ensure that a bank has an adequate stock of 
unencumbered high quality liquid assets (HQLA) that consists of cash or assets that can be converted into cash at little 
or no loss of value in private markets, to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario" (BIS; 
2013). 
The NSFR was developed to provide a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities, and emphasizes the 
importance of more stable and longer-term sources of funding that can help to prevent long-term liquidity crises. It is to 
be introduced on January 1st, 2018 and is expected to have significant impact on the current banking system. The NSFR 
and its determinants is the focus of the present work. 
The NSFR is a microprudential regulation designed to minimize liquidity crises by giving banks at the entity-level 
certain incentives to favor assets and liabilities that are less risk-averse. Its main aim is to address the problem of 
long-term less-liquid assets (i.e. loans) that are funded by short-term or less trustworthy sources. It can be defined as the 
available Amount of Stable Funding (ASF) over required stable funding (RSF), with banks being required to meet a 
minimum of 100 % regulatory ratio. 
ASF is a part of bank‟s funding available for over one year. The required stable funding (RSF) is part of bank‟s assets 
and off-balance sheet exposures considered illiquid for over one year, and needs to be support by stable funding. The 
aim of the NSFR is to lower the probability of a liquidity run and to support an institution undergoing funding 
difficulties for at least one year.  
The amount of RSF is calculated by measuring the value of a bank‟s assets in the certain category. “The amount 
assigned to each category is then multiplied by its associated RSF factor and the total RSF is the sum of the weighted 
amounts added to the amount of OBS activity (or potential liquidity exposure) multiplied by its associated RSF factor.” 
(BCBS 271; 2014) 
5. Empirical Analysis  
5.1 Methodology 
First, NSFR for the 8300 European banks was calculated using the BCBS (2014) methodology. Subsequently, in order 
to identify determinants of the new liquidity framework for European banks proposed under Basel III, empirical 
analysis of panel data was used.  
5.2 Construction of the Dependent Variable: NSFR 
As described in the previous section, the NSFR regulatory ratio is composed of a numerator (ASF) and a denominator 
(RSF). To represent the stability of funding for liability items and the liquidity of asset items the weights of available 
stable funding  and required stable funding  range from 100 % to 0 %. A higher numerator (available stable funding) 
shows more stable funding. For instance, regulatory capital has a 100 % ASF factor, meanwhile "stable non-maturity 
(demand) deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than one year provided by retail and small business 
customers" have a 95 % ASF factor. Liabilities without a stated maturity and “Trade date” payables arising from 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 4, No. 6; 2017 
81 
 
purchases of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities have a 0 percent ASF. Appendix A contains a 
summary of liability categories and associated ASF factors.  In the same way, liquid assets have lower RSF weight, 
and illiquid assets have a higher RSF weight. Coins and banknotes immediately available to meet obligations, like all 
central bank reserves, have a 0 % RSF factor. Conversely, all assets that are "encumbered for a period of one year or 
more", non-performing loans, loans to financial institutions with a residual maturity of one year or more, 
non-exchange-traded equities, fixed assets etc.  are assigned a 100 % RSF factor. These include, for example, all loans 
to financial institutions and central banks with residual maturity of between six months and less than one year; and 
"deposits held at other financial institutions for operational purposes",  categories with a residual maturity of less than 
one year, including "loans to non-financial corporate clients, loans to retail customers (i.e. natural persons) and small 
business customers, and loans to sovereigns and PSEs." (BCBS; 2014). For further details, Appendix B summarizes the 
specific types of assets assigned to each category and their associated RSF factor, and Appendix C presents off-balance 
sheet categories and associated RSF factors. 
5.3 Econometric Estimation 
The dependent variables and the independent variable NSFR used in the regression analysis are shown in Table1 . 
Table 1. Variables and sources of the data 
List of bank specific variables:   
Concept Variable Source 
Net Stable Funding Ratio NSFR 
Author's calculation based on BankScope 
(Bureau van Dijk), BCBS methodology, 
European Banking  Federation 
LOG(Total Assets) Size 
Author's calculation based on BankScope 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
Loans / Customer Deposits % LOAN_DEP BankScope (Bureau van Dijk) 
Interbank Assets / Interbank Liabilities % INTERB BankScope (Bureau van Dijk) 
Cost To Income Ratio % COST_INC BankScope (Bureau van Dijk) 
Total Regulatory Capital Ratio % CAR BankScope (Bureau van Dijk) 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) % ROA BankScope (Bureau van Dijk) 
Non-Interest Expense / Average Assets% NOINT_EXP BankScope (Bureau van Dijk) 
Bank Failure (Moody‟s bank financial strength 
rating, Basel capital, State) 
BANKRUPT 
Author's calculation based on BankScope 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
Monetary Policy Variables   
Demand for central bank liquidity ECB_LENDING Euro Crisi Monitor 
Dummy Variables   
Specialization: commercial, cooperative, 
savings, Bank Holding & Holding Companies 
are coded as 1, and others 0. 
SPEC 
Author's calculation based on BankScope 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
Variables linked to the listed or non listed 
aspect. Listed=1, non listed=0. 
LISTED 
Author's calculation based on BankScope 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
Internationally active entity =1, local=0 INTERN 
Author's calculation based on BankScope 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
Variable that is equal to 1 during 2006-2007 
and others 0. 
CRISIS Author's calculation 
if Entity_type ='Controlled subs.' then 
Control=1; else Control=0; 
CONTROL 
Author's calculation based on BankScope 
(Bureau van Dijk) 
Listed - unlisted distribution is shown in the Table 2. 
Table 2. Percentage of number, bank total assets of listed and unlisted banks  
 
Country distribution is shown in Figure 1.  
The sample contains data for following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
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United Kingdom. The analysis was first conducted for the Eurozone banks in order to consider ECB policies and 
features of the Eurozone market. It was then conducted for non-Eurozone countries. 
 
Figure 1. Country distribution 
* All Sample Countries. Source: Bankscope 
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Figure 2. Specializations ( Distribution of Entities) 
Source: Bankscope 
The Hausman Test was performed on data to determine the appropriate method. This test does not reject the null 
hypothesis in favor of the random effect model. There is no random effect in these panel data. The F test was then 
performed and showed that the data satisfy the fixed-effects assumptions. The F test rejects the null hypothesis of no 
fixed time effect (F=6.12, p<.0001). That is, there is a fixed time effect in these panel data. The fixed effect regression 
method is thus used to analyze full sample of European banks. 
 
Where Lit is Liquidity ratio (NSFR) for bank i in time t, Xit= vector of explanatory variables for bank i in time t, α = 
constant, β‟  = coefficient, δi=fixed effects in bank i, εi= error term 
OLS regression was used for each single country. 
5.4 Data Overview and Economic Implications 
The dependent variable is the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) for the banks of the Euro area countries for the period 
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Independent variables  
Bank failure (BANKRUPT). The main methodological approach consists of three steps. First, the BankScope database 
is evaluated and banks that are labeled as “bankrupt,” “dissolved” (by liquidation or merger), “in liquidation”, or “under 
receivership” are selected. Second, the Basel capital ratio (CAR) is measured for each bank, and banks having  CAR 
lower than 8% between 2008 and 2009 are selected. Finally, banks categorized as “in distress” with rating E+ or E in  
Moody‟s bank financial strength rating are selected.  
This method of selection is helpful in identifying banks, which are typically smaller and non-systematically important, 
which failed and underwent a process of resolution.(IMF; 2012) 
Demand for central bank liquidity. The NSFR influences the demand for central bank liquidity only when refinancing 
tools are longer than one year, so banks may decide to increase their long term funding and reduce their short term 
funding. But where there is a structural liquidity deficit, demand will not go down, and banks will thus prefer 
refinancing operations over one year. This will raise ASF, and at the same time, the amount of encumbered assets. 
NSFR is therefore positively  related to demand for central bank liquidity, though collateral effects of  RSF pledged 
with the central bank should be considered. 
Specialization (SPEC). Business models of  bank differ in the way they treat liability and have different NSFR impact. 
For instance, investment banks have limited access to retail deposits and largely rely on wholesale funding and  will be 
heavily hit by the new liquidity standard (Credit Suisse, 2012). Retail banks on the other hand have better access to 
stable funding and consequently have more favorable funding in terms of NSFR. 
Interbank ratio (INTERB). The positive relationship is consistent with the fact that the proportion of the interbank 
assets to interbank liabilities can reveal the level of bank‟s liquidity in the interbank market. In fact, where there are 
problems on interbank markets relating to a high interbank risk premium, the number of interbank market transactions 
decrease and banks with liquidity shortage face more difficulty in finding a lender (see Hlebik, Verga 2015). 
Total capital ratio (CAR). Banks with higher risk exposures seek  to ensure their solvency by availability of an 
adequate amount of capital. In general, the minimum capital requirement serves to lower the risk of insolvency and at 
the same time helps banks to continue to play their role as  intermediary necessary for economic progress. In fact „risk 
absorption‟ theory is that higher capital facilitates liquidity creation. This is supported by Diamond et. (1983) and Allen 
et. (2004), who explore the interaction between liquidity creation and risk exposure of banks. Banks are generally prone 
to higher losses when they have greater liquidity needs. In this scenario, illiquid assets can be sold off at available rather 
than desirable market prices. Nevertheless, Bhattacharya et. (1993) and Coval et. (2005) point out that in such cases 
capital absorption can alleviate predisposition to risks and make banks more risk resilient in general. Further, Repullo 
(2004) demonstrates that shock absorption is more effective when the bank has higher capital adequacy. These studies 
all indicate that there is significant link between higher capital ratios and bank‟s ability to generate liquidity. Bank 
liquidity is under less stress where there is a higher endowment of capital.  
Loan-to-deposit ratio (LOAN_DEP). The present analysis shows a negative relation between NSFR and the loan to 
deposit ratio. The indicator considers the proportion of illiquid loans (assets) on liquid liabilities, and thus expresses a 
lending institution's ability to cover withdrawals made by its customers. The NSFR implies that loans with residual 
maturity below one year should be financed by stable funding, which  entails  increasing the cost of loans. In fact, the 
NSFR is calibrated under the assumption that "short-term (maturing in less than one year) deposits provided by retail 
customers and funding provided by small business customers are behaviorally more stable than wholesale funding of 
the same maturity from other counterparties" (BCBS; 2014 ). 
Profitability (ROA). The new liquidity framework will affect banks‟ behavior, and  which implies a negative 
relationship with profitability. For example, in order to comply with  the Net Stable Funding Ratio,  banks are 
expected to lengthen average maturity and replace short-term with longer term funding. Because of  term premia, this 
will increase their costs, and thus lower profitability. 
SIZE (natural logarithm of total assets). NSFR is negatively related to bank size. Delechatet (2012) advises small banks 
to obtain more liquidity if they are financially limited. Based on a substantial sample of US banks, Kashyap et al. (2002) 
concludes that there is a direct link between bank size and the amount of liquid assets that it holds. Smaller banks are 
considered to be more liquid since their access to capital markets is more limited 
Cost Income Ratio (COST_INC) determines operating costs as a percentage of operating income. The negative 
relationship between this ratio and the NSFR shows that less efficient banks have more difficulties in meeting new 
requirements.  
Non-Interest Expense ratio (Noint_exp) is calculated by annualizing fixed operating costs incurred by a financial 
institution; salaries and employee benefits, running costs, costs of  fixed assets, and other non-interest expenses, 
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divided by average assets. A positive relationship between this ratio and NSFR indicates that banks more successful in 
reaching the Basel III liquidity requirements (NSFR) spend more resources on HR and invest in information systems 
which reduce data processing costs. This spending is crucial for the procurement and retention of competent specialists. 
6. Conclusion 
Stable systemic liquidity conditions are vital for the financial sector and macroeconomic stability. Liquidity is a 
systemic and fundamental notion and deviation from appropriate levels of availability can lead to a systemic financial 
crises.  
The results of our empirical analysis provide the following conclusions. There are significant and positive relationships 
between liquidity and capital adequacy of banks. The liquidity indicator  increases with the Non-Interest Expense to 
Average Assets indicator, although the impact and the dynamics are different across European banks. For instance, 
holding all other variables constant, on average, for every one percent increase in this ratio, the increase in the NSFR is 
bigger for France (+0.073%) , Italy (+0.051%) and Spain (+0.045%)  and it impacts to a lesser extent for Germany 
(+0.019%). 
Our analysis also indicates that net stable funding ratio is negatively related to bank size, but positively related to 
interbank ratio. As is often said, large banks are “too big to fail” and have no difficulty borrowing money on the 
interbank market or finding support from Central banks. Smaller banks however are more likely to have  a „cushion‟ of 
liquid assets. Liquidity tightening importantly tends to indicate the presence of underlying bank weaknesses which need 
to be interpreted. 
ECB lending has a positive impact on NSFR. In turn, loan-to-deposit ratio, ROA as well as bankruptcy are negatively 
related to NSFR. It is clear that the regulation of liquidity risk will have a noticeable impact on the way banks operate. 
Furthermore, the liquidity standards will influence money markets, as well as transmission mechanisms of monetary 
policy, and central banks will be required to carefully consider these aspects once the new Basel standard comes into 
force. 
The NSFR is one of the key aspects of the review of the Capital Requirements Directives for the financial services 
industry and it raises several issues in terms of cost and benefit. Further consideration is required concerning the 
asymmetrical treatment of repos and reverse repos, cash/non cash collateral, derivatives and coherence the Stable 
Funding Ratio with short-term liquidity coverage ratio (LCR). 
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Appendix A 
Summary of liability categories and associated ASF factors 
ASF 
factor 
Components of ASF category 
100%  
• Total regulatory capital (excluding Tier 2 instruments with residual maturity of less than one year)  
• Other capital instruments and liabilities with effective residual maturity of one year or more  
95%  
• Stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than one year 
provided by retail and small business customers  
90%  
• Less stable non-maturity deposits and term deposits with residual maturity of less than one year provided by 
retail and small business customers  
50%  
• Funding with residual maturity of less than one year provided by non-financial corporate customers  
• Operational deposits  
• Funding with residual maturity of less than one year from sovereigns, PSEs, and multilateral and national 
development banks  
• Other funding with residual maturity between six months and less than one year not included in the above 
categories, including funding provided by central banks and financial institutions  
0%  
• All other liabilities and equity not included in the above categories, including liabilities without a stated 
maturity (with a specific treatment for deferred tax liabilities and minority interests)  
• NSFR derivative liabilities net of NSFR derivative assets if NSFR derivative liabilities are greater than 
NSFR derivative assets  









Summary of asset categories and associated RSF factors 
RSF 
factor 
Components of RSF category 
0%  
• Coins and banknotes  
• All central bank reserves  
• All claims on central banks with residual maturities of less than six months  
• “Trade date” receivables arising from sales of financial instruments, foreign currencies and commodities.  
5%  • Unencumbered Level 1 assets, excluding coins, banknotes and central bank reserves  
10%  
• Unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than six months, where the loan 
is secured against Level 1 assets as defined in LCR paragraph 50, and where the bank has the ability to freely 
rehypothecate the received collateral for the life of the loan  
15%  
• All other unencumbered loans to financial institutions with residual maturities of less than six months not 
included in the above categories  
• Unencumbered Level 2A assets 
50%  
• Unencumbered Level 2B assets  
• HQLA encumbered for a period of six months or more and less than one year  
• Loans to financial institutions and central banks with residual maturities between six months and less than one 
year  
• Deposits held at other financial institutions for operational purposes  
• All other assets not included in the above categories with residual maturity of less than one year, including 
loans to non-financial corporate clients, loans to retail and small business customers, and loans to sovereigns 
and PSEs  
65%  
• Unencumbered residential mortgages with a residual maturity of one year or more and with a risk weight of 
less than or equal to 35% under the Standardised Approach  
• Other unencumbered loans not included in the above categories, excluding loans to financial institutions, with 
a residual maturity of one year or more and with a risk weight of less than or equal to 35% under the 
standardised approach  
85%  
• Cash, securities or other assets posted as initial margin for derivative contracts and cash or other assets 
provided to contribute to the default fund of a CCP  
• Other unencumbered performing loans with risk weights greater than 35% under the standardised approach 
and residual maturities of one year or more, excluding loans to financial institutions  
• Unencumbered securities that are not in default and do not qualify as HQLA with a remaining maturity of one 
year or more and exchange-traded equities  
• Physicaltradedcommodities, includinggold 
100%  
• All assets that are encumbered for a period of one year or more  
• NSFR derivative assets net of NSFR derivative liabilities if NSFR derivative assets are greater than NSFR 
derivative liabilities  
• 20% of derivative liabilities as calculated according to paragraph 19  
• All other assets not included in the above categories, including non-performing loans, loans to financial 
institutions with a residual maturity of one year or more, non-exchange-traded equities, fixed assets, items 
deducted from regulatory capital, retained interest, insurance assets, subsidiary interests and defaulted 
securities. 
Appendix C 
Summary of off-balance sheet categories and associated RSF factors 
RSF factor RSF category 
5% of the currently undrawn portion  
Irrevocable and conditionally revocable credit and liquidity facilities to 
any client  
National supervisors can specify the RSF 
factors based on their national 
circumstances  
Other contingent funding obligations, including products and instruments 
such as:  
• Unconditionally revocable credit and liquidity facilities  
• Trade finance-related obligations (including guarantees and letters of 
credit)  
• Guarantees and letters of credit unrelated to trade finance obligations  
• Non-contractual obligations such as:  
− potential requests for debt repurchases of the bank‟s own debt or that of 
related conduits, securities investment vehicles and other such financing 
facilities  
− structured products where customers anticipate ready marketability, 
such as adjustable rate notes and variable rate demand notes (VRDNs)  
− managed funds that are marketed with the objective of maintaining a 
stable value 




The fixed effect regression method 
All Eurozone countries: 
 
R-Square = 0.6500 and C(p) = 13.6279 
Eurozone complete sample. Descriptive statistics 
 




                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
  Variable    Label               N           Mean        Std Dev        Minimum        Maximum 
  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
  NSFR_perc                    8293    102.1509177     30.9652741     36.0706250    309.4444179 
  intern      INTERNATIONAL    8293      0.0307488      0.1726468              0      1.0000000 
  listed      LISTED           8293      0.0274931      0.1635250              0      1.0000000 
  CONTROL     CONTROLLED       8293      0.0900760      0.2863078              0      1.0000000 
  SPEC        SPECIALIZATION   8293      0.9776920      0.1476921              0      1.0000000 
  SIZE        SIZE             8293     13.4877740      1.8093631      9.5104450     21.6153106 
  LOAN_DEP    LOAN_DEP         8293     96.7072037     43.2834836      0.0400000    302.2100000 
  INTERB      INTERB           8293    134.8874460    145.8564347      9.5300000    896.9700000 
  CAR         CAR              8293     16.2351947      4.6275006      9.9500000     45.1500000 
  NOINT_EXP   NOINT_EXP        8293      2.2782154      0.6869544              0     11.7100000 
  GDP         GDP              8293      0.2645002      3.8135601    -14.2000000      6.5000000 
  COST_INC    COST_INC         8293     68.1766592     10.4770485      8.6210000    142.6210000 
  ROA         ROA              8293      0.3413857      0.3103225     -0.1570000      3.8170000 
  BANKRUPT    BANKRUPT         8293      0.0063909      0.0796922              0      1.0000000 
  Ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
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Non - Eurozone countries: 
 
R-Square = 0.7041 and C(p) = 5.3079 
All variables left in the model are significant at the 0.1000 level. 
Non-Eurozone descriptive statistics shown in Table 4. 
All missing values, outlier<% 5th and> 95th percentiles, as well as values that do not belong to the target population, 




                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable     Label               N            Mean         Std Dev         Minimum         Maximum 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
NSFR_perc                      708      84.2450955      31.7855776      36.0979704     286.3394188 
intern       INTERNATIONAL     708       0.1553672       0.3625105               0       1.0000000 
listed       LISTED            708       0.3192090       0.4664997               0       1.0000000 
CONTROL      CONTROLLED        708       0.3177966       0.4659491               0       1.0000000 
SPEC         SPECIALIZATION    708       0.8064972       0.3953229               0       1.0000000 
SIZE         SIZE              708      15.4136663       2.4812596      11.3072751      21.6736493 
LOAN_DEP     LOAN_DEP          708     116.2994915      39.7849104       4.8700000     271.3200000 
INTERB       INTERB            708     118.6050989     149.0651393       9.4900000     870.4700000 
CAR          CAR               708      16.2747316       4.2583057       9.9500000      44.3000000 
NOINT_EXP    NOINT_EXP         708       2.1387147       1.6632975       0.3800000      15.1400000 
GDP          GDP               708       0.6000000       3.4792169     -14.7000000       9.7000000 
COST_INC     COST_INC          708      60.8989986      14.6467974      22.5790000     149.6060000 
ROA          ROA               708       0.7484124       0.6140283      -0.1510000       3.7870000 
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Results of the model for Germany, France, Italy, Spain:  
Dependent Variable: NSFR.*/**/*** refer to the coefficient significance at 10%/5%/1% level respectively. 
Dependent Variable: GERMANY FRANCE ITALY SPAIN 
C 1.41647*** 1.52311*** 0.92891*** 0.87285*** 
NSFR(-1) 0.02382*** -0.09543*** - - 
CONTROL 0.06749*** - 0.04749*** 0.04760*** 
SIZE -0.01169*** -0.02304* - - 
LOAN_DEP -0.00409*** -0.00129*** -0.00223*** -0.00220*** 
INTERB 0.000855*** 0.00055** 0.000099*** 0.0000957*** 
COST_INC -0.000758*** -0.00261** -0.000953** - 
CAR 0.00394*** -0.01435** 0.00780*** 0.00741*** 
ROA -0.07257*** -0.15454** - 0.02213*** 
NOINT_EXP 0.01900*** 0.07313*** 0.05148*** 0.04467*** 
ECB_LENDING 6.532E-8** - 2.695E-7*** 3.1492E-7*** 
BANKRUPT - - -0.04087* -0.04017* 
SPEC - - -0.10444*** -0.10616*** 
No. observations: 6821 145 1905 1905 
R-square 0.7322 0.4775 0.5274 0.5287 
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